

DIA DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

3 SEP 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

THROUGH: Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Interim Report of the CIA/DIA Panel on the
Soviet Ground ForceREFERENCE: DCI Letter to Secretary McNamara, Subject: CIA/DIA
Study of the Soviet Ground Force, 8 April 1963


1. This memorandum contains background information and recommends certain actions in paragraph 5 which you should take at the earliest possible time. Paragraph 6 presents a proposal for your consideration. The attached envelope contains the following papers pertinent to this memorandum:

- a. a folder of background correspondence,
- b. the interim report of the CIA/DIA Panel, and
- c. a draft of a letter to Secretary McNamara,
proposed for your signature, transmitting
the interim report.

2. In reply to Secretary McNamara's request of 13 February, you sent him the referenced letter which stated that a CIA/DIA Panel had been set up to study the Soviet ground force and that an interim report would be sent to him in August. Your letter also stated that you would decide on "the type of long run program that will best serve to improve our estimates in this field."

3. After considerable fruitless negotiation with DIA, the CIA/DIA Panel started operating productively in June; since that time, DIA co-operation has been exemplary. The Panel has now finished its interim report which covers two of the seven questions which concerned the Secretary. (Considerable background work has already been started on some of the other questions.) The interim report is the result of an exhaustive, objective and

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thorough study and is endorsed by both the DIA and CIA members of the Panel. [] commented on an earlier draft, and those comments which the Panel considered pertinent have been incorporated.

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4. A comparison of the estimates in the most recent National Intelligence Estimate dealing with the Soviet ground force (NIE 11-14-62) and the assessments presented in the interim report of the Panel shows no major inconsistencies; however, the NIE numbers are generally higher and imply greater precision than seems justified by the Panel's review of the evidence. The attached table presents some comparisons between the NIE and the Panel's interim report.

5. It is recommended that you approve this interim report of the Panel and send it with the proposed transmittal letter to Secretary McNamara. The principal conclusions and a general understanding of the interim report can be obtained by reading the first five pages and scanning page 14, 24-29, and 59-63. Before transmitting the interim report, it would be appropriate for you to tell General Carroll that you are sending it to the Secretary and inquire about the General's reaction. I understand that [] (DIA co-chairman of the Panel) had a three-hour discussion on this matter with General Carroll who feels that the interim report should be forwarded to the Secretary as the tentative conclusions of CIA/DIA Panel but that the final report (expected early next year) should represent the agreed views of both CIA and DIA (not just the Panel's) with any disagreements noted.

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6. Because certain important inadequacies of the evidence on the Soviet ground force were found in the course of the Panel's work, it is recommended that you consider setting up a group from within the intelligence community to determine what should be done about these inadequacies. (This problem should not delay the forwarding of the interim report to Secretary McNamara.)

7. The following findings as to the adequacy of the evidence should be noted:

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a. The evidence available on those aspects of the problem considered in the interim report is not adequate for narrow-range, high-confidence, quantitative assessments.

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c. Based on a preliminary review, the CIA members of the Panel feel (though this is not stated in the interim report) that the evidence presently available will yield very little about the inventories or production of ground force equipment. The information currently available on this subject is generally old and very fragmentary. On many items which are sure to have accounted for a major portion of the Soviet expenditures on land armaments (such as ammunition), there appears to be no direct evidence on which to base reasonable assessments.

8. Some of the inadequacies of evidence probably can be overcome by new collection programs and higher priorities for processing information; however, it is unlikely that any projects which can now be undertaken will yield the evidence necessary for producing the kinds of assessments on important aspects of the Soviet ground force that are desired by policy planners. In order to check this pessimistic view, it is suggested that you consider setting up a group of collectors, processors and estimators to:

- a. determine the kinds of information that are needed;
- b. determine how much of this information additional collection, processing and analysis can produce; and
- c. assess whether the costs involved are worth the improvements in assessments which are likely to result.

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CIA Member, CIA/DIA Panel

Attachment:
Table

Enclosures:
As stated above

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Table

Comparison of Selected Estimates on the Soviet Ground Force in NIE 11-14-62 and Assessments in the CIA/DIA Panel Interim Report

	<u>NIE 11-14-62*</u>	<u>Panel Report **</u>
<u>Number of Soviet Line Divisions</u>		
At Various Strengths		
Most Probable	145	115-135
Range	120-150	100-150
At Combat Strength		
Total	80	58-75
Eastern Europe and Western USSR	49	45-55
<u>Number of Military Personnel</u>		
Total (million)	nearly 2	1.8-2.1
Portion in Line Divisions	over half	half or less

* As of 1 October 1962.

** As of first half of 1963.

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